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The goal of the paper is twofold. Firstly, it explains the relevance of the Graded
Salience Hypothesis (Giora 1997; 2003; Kecskés 2001) to pragmatics research, arguing
that although this hypothesis is a psycholinguistic theory it may contribute signifi-
cantly to our understanding of pragmatic processing. Secondly, it will be claimed and
demonstrated through examples that the salient meaning of lexical units constituting
utterances in conversation plays a more important role in comprehension than has
been believed by the supporters of linguistic, sociolinguistic and pragmatic theories
that consider context to be the main source of actual contextual meaning.
1. The Graded Salience Hypothesis
The Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH) claims that in the initial phase of
language comprehension, contextual and lexical processes do not interact
but run parallel, and this stage is dominated by lexical access (Giora 1997;
2003). Salient meanings of lexical units are first accessed automatically
and are then revised in the case of a misfit with context. Context becomes
effective postlexically. Salient meanings of lexical units are determined by
factors such as prior experience with the word or expression, familiarity,
and frequency of encounters. As stated in the two goals of the paper
given above, I will focus on two important claims of the GSH which are
especially relevant to the processing of pragmatic units:
(a) Salient meanings of lexical units are privileged meanings stored in
the mind of individuals at a given time in a given speech community.
(b) Context operates independently in the first phase of processing. It
may be highly predictive, but it does not interact with lexical access
and only becomes effective postlexically.
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2. Privileged meaning
2.1. What is salience?
Geeraerts (2000) argued that systematic attention to salience phenomena
is one of the major innovations of the cognitive approach which includes
aspects of use in the description of lexical categories. It is emphasized
that some senses are more salient than others because they are more
readily chosen when using that category. Prototype theory showed “how
the various semantic applications that exist within the boundaries of one
particular category need not have the same structural weight within that
category” (Geeraerts 2000, 79–80). Salience is where structure and use
meet. In spite of this, salience is ignored in traditional lexical seman-
tics which focuses on the description of various meanings of lexical items
and structural relations among those meanings. Although the traditional
approach gives a structured list of possibilities that language users may
choose from in actual communication, the actual choices of the language
users and the study of communication processes leading to those choices
are completely ignored. In the cognitive approach salience directs atten-
tion to these important factors of human verbal interaction.
Salience is essential in the analysis of pragmatic units and prag-
matic processing because it is usually seen as the structural reflection
of pragmatic phenomena. This combination of semantic and pragmatic
perspectives requires a slightly different understanding of the notion of
‘structure’ than is customary. Geeraerts (2000, 80) argued that “whereas
linguistic structures would traditionally be seen merely as ordered sets of
possibilities, adding pragmatic-based salience implies introducing prob-
abilities rather than just possibilities.” This means that salience refers
to the most probable out of all possible interpretations of a lexical unit.
The most salient meaning of a specific word, expression or utterance
is the most conventional, frequent, familiar, or prototypical interpreta-
tion. For instance: The most probable interpretation of the word gay is
‘homosexual’ rather than ‘merry’ or ‘lively’.
For pragmatic analysis, salience is important because words and
larger lexical units such as idioms and situation-bound utterances usually
have multiple meanings, and some of these meanings are more accessible
than others because we ascribe greater cognitive priority in our mental
lexicon to some meanings over the rest. This sounds reasonable. But why
is this so? What determines whether a particular meaning of a lexical
unit receives priority in the mental lexicon or not? What is the reason
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the most salient meaning of the word cool is not ‘moderately cold’, which
is given as the primary meaning (1) in the dictionary (Morris 1976, 292),
but rather ‘excellent, first-rate’, which is given as meaning (8) marked
as “slang”? Why is it that out of 30 native-speaker respondents all con-
sidered ‘easy’ as the most salient meaning of the expression piece of cake
rather than the literal meaning of the lexical unit (Kecskés 2003, 130)?
The answer to these questions seems relatively simple: because of prior
experience and prior encounters with the word in relatively similar and
typical contexts.
The fact that salience is based on prior experience has an especially
important bearing on language processing of non-native speakers. Dif-
ferent experience results in different salience, and L2 acquisition differs
significantly from L1 acquisition. Consequently, what is salient for in-
dividuals belonging to an L1 community will not necessarily be salient
for the “newcomers”, the L2 learners. When acquiring another language,
learners do two things. Firstly, they rely on prior knowledge which is
the knowledge of the first language and the socio-cultural background
that the L1 is based on. Secondly, they also give priority to certain
meanings they encounter in the second language. However, the meaning
which emerges as the most salient one in the case of a lexical unit in
the L2 may differ significantly from what native speakers of the target
language consider as the most salient meaning of that particular lexical
or pragmatic unit. The next conversation illustrates this point:
(1) (Aysa, a Turkish student is applying for a research assistantship. This is the end
of her job interview:)
Professor: “Is there anything else you want to tell us about yourself?”
Aysa: “Uh,. . . no, nothing. . . When can I call for the result?”
Professor: “There is no need to contact us. We’ll call you.”
Aysa: “Ok, but,. . . uhm,. . . when?”
Professor: “Very soon.”
In this conversation the Turkish student has no idea that the professor’s
words There is no need to contact us. We’ll call you actually mean re-
fusal. Misunderstandings can only be comprehended fully by recourse to
both parties’ cognition. In this case there is a clear discrepancy between
what is salient for the professor and what is salient for the student.
This example shows us two things: firstly, that salience is based on
prior knowledge and experience, and so it is a degree of familiarity, and
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secondly, that salience is dynamic, and ready to change if use, environ-
ment, society, and speakers change.
2.2. What does salient meaning encode?
Giora (2003, 103) claimed that “privileged meanings, meanings foremost
on our mind, affect comprehension and production primarily, regardless
of context or literality.” What does salient meaning encode? How does
it emerge as most privileged? Where does this “privilege” come from?
The most salient meaning(s) encodes (encode) standard context in
which the given lexical item repeatedly occurs, on which we build our ex-
pectations about what may or may not happen, and on which our ability
to understand and predict how the world around us works is based (cf.
Violi 2000). The more encounters we have with this encoded meaning,
the more familiar the situation(s) in which it occurs repeatedly may be-
come. Factors such as frequency, familiarity, and prototypicality play a
decisive role in shaping the “privileged” status of a particular possible
meaning which may become the most probable one of all possible mean-
ings of a lexical unit. The following example may shed some light on this
phenomenon: I was supposed to have a meeting with one of my Ph.D.
students who is a native speaker of English. She was late. When she
entered my office, she said Hello, and gave the following explanation:
(2) Sorry. I was held up at a gas station. Not literally though.
This linguistic behavior of the student raises the question: Why did she
find it important to add Not literally though after the use of the lexical
unit hold up? Why did she think that I could misunderstand her? Was
it because she knew I was a non-native speaker? Not really. I confronted
her with these questions. She said that she did not want me to mis-
understand her and think that there was actually a hold-up at the gas
station. The student actually thought that the literal meaning of the
verb hold up was ‘rob’ which is clearly the figurative meaning. According
to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Morris
1976, 628), the lexical entry hold up has the following readings:
1. to prevent from falling; to support,
2. to present for exhibit; to show,
3. to last; to stand up; to endure,
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4. to stop or interrupt; to delay,
5. to rob.
So why was this confusion in the mind of this native speaker of American
English? It is likely that what happened was that she equated the most
frequent and familiar meaning, i.e., the most salient meaning, with the
literal meaning. Is this something that is unique to one speaker only, or
is it a generalizable fact? It does seem to be. The traditional linguistic
approach claims that in most people’s mind it is the literal meaning from
which all other meanings derive. The belief about the primacy of the
literal meaning is so strongly conventionalized that not everyone notices
when there is a shift in the semantic structure of a word, and what was
once the most familiar, most frequent, and most conventionalized of all
possible senses gives way to another sense which takes over as the most
salient sense but not as the literal meaning. The important thing is that
from the perspective of the GSH it is absolutely irrelevant whether the
most salient sense is the literal meaning or the figurative meaning of the
lexical unit. The most salient meaning can be either literal or figurative.
What is important in our example is that there was a shift in lexical
representation which has not led to a shift in conceptual representation.
This fact also confirms the need to differentiate between lexical semantics
and conceptual semantics. The literal–figurative dichotomy makes sense
for language analysis, but not for language processing, where it cannot
be claimed that literal is always processed before figurative.
2.3. Conventionality and culture-specificity of salience
Salience is not something that is exactly the same for each member of
a language community, but it certainly is the same for the majority.
Some native speakers of English may argue that when they ask someone
How are you doing? it is not a semantically empty expression for them
because they mean what they say. Moreover, one and the same person
can use this expression in its literal or figurative sense depending on the
situation or individual communicative need. This may be true in the
case of certain people and certain situations, but it can hardly be denied
that this expression usually functions like a greeting or a conversation-
opener, or just as a sign that the speaker noticed the recipient. Why is
that so? Because this expression primarily encodes a standard context
which is associated with its most frequent and familiar use. Nunberg
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et al. (1994, 492) view conventionality as “a relation among a linguistic
regularity, a situation of use, and a population that has implicitly agreed
to conform to that regularity in that situation out of preference for general
uniformity, rather than because there is some obvious and compelling
reason to conform to that regularity instead of some other.”
Conventionalization is a culture-specific phenomenon. What func-
tions are conventionalized and how these functions are lexicalized is cul-
ture-dependent. This is why something that sounds good in one language
may sound odd in another. Hungarian Americans often try to use a Hun-
garian equivalent of an American English expression:
(3) A: Kérsz még egy kis bort? ‘Would you like some more wine?’
B: Nem, köszönöm, jól vagyok. ‘No, thank you, I am fine.’
It sounds awkward to use jól vagyok as an equivalent of I am fine in
this situation.
Kecskés (2000; 2003) argued that lexicalization of a similar con-
ventional event in different languages is motivated and culture-specific.
There is a cognitive reason why one expression and not another denotes
a situational event in this or that culture, or why one culture finds it
important to use an expression in a given situation while the other ig-
nores that. For instance, please help yourself is often used by Americans
at the table to urge their guests to start to eat or take some more food.
The original cognitive mechanism responsible for the situational mean-
ing of the expression could be described as follows: Take as much as you
wish. I don’t want to help you because you know how much you need
→ so help yourself to as much as you need. This culture-specific prag-
matic property of expression is no longer maintained consciously. So no
inferential reasoning is necessary to find out that the speaker asks you
to help yourself not because he does not want to help you but because
he thinks that you yourself know exactly how much you want to eat.
The linguistic form has acquired a pragmatically motivated sense which
became conventionalized.
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3. Salience and context
3.1. The psycholinguistic view
The most important contribution of the GSH to our understanding of
language comprehension and production is the explanation of the inter-
play of encoded meaning and contextual information in shaping actual
communicative meaning. This has always been one of the major issues
of language processing research. The idea of the priority of context and
selective compliance with contextual information has dominated theo-
retical and applied linguistics, sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and language
teaching research for decades. This interactionist, direct access view (e.g.,
MacWhinney 1987) assumes that a strong context governs language pro-
cessing and thus significantly affects lexical processes very early on. There
is only a single mechanism that is sensitive to both linguistic and non-
linguistic information. Comprehension does not involve a contextually
incompatible stage at all. Context activates the contextually appropriate
interpretation only. Because the direct access approach presupposes that
contextual information interacts with lexical processes upon encounter,
the first step—the one that taps the contextually appropriate meaning
directly—is the only step (Giora 2003, 63).
An alternative to the direct access view is the modular view (e.g.,
Fodor 1983) which assumes that there are two distinct mechanisms: one
bottom-up, sensitive to linguistic information and another, top-down,
sensitive to contextual knowledge (both linguistic and extralinguistic).
During processing all meanings of a word are activated upon encounter,
regardless of contextual information. At times, the output of the linguis-
tic module would cohere with contextual information; on other occasions,
however, it would not and would require further inferential processes. So
adjustment to contextual information happens later on and results in
selecting the appropriate meaning while suppressing the contextually in-
appropriate meanings.
The GSH, which is considered a third alternative, claims, like the
modular view, that there are two distinct mechanisms running parallel:
an exhaustive but salience-sensitive mechanism that is receptive to lin-
guistic information but impervious to context effects, and a predictive,
integrative mechanism that is sensitive to linguistic and non-linguistic
contextual information and interacts with lexical outputs. However, un-
like the modular view (according to which all possible meanings are acti-
vated first, then “the lexicon proposes and context disposes” (see Bates
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1999), the GSH assumes that the modular, lexical access mechanism is
ordered: More salient meanings — encoded meanings foremost on our
mind due to conventionality, familiarity, frequency or prototypicality—
are accessed faster than and reach sufficient levels of activation before
less salient ones. And the context does not always dispose, depending on
the role of the so-called irrelevant meanings in shaping the final interpre-
tation (Giora 2003). Gibbs (1994, 89–90) found that intended meaning of
conventional utterances (idioms and indirect requests) has been processed
without any analysis of the sentence’s literal meaning. In Giora’s inter-
pretation, these findings demonstrate the effect of meaning salience rather
than attest to context effects because the most salient meaning of idioms
and conventionalized indirect requests (for instance: Why don’t you sit
down? ) is their figurative meaning rather than their literal meaning.
Giora (2003, 11) gives a convincing example to show the interplay of
lexical salience and context. In a discourse about computers the computer
appliance meaning of the word mouse would be expected to be the first
to occur to the participants. This demonstrates that a highly predictive
context may make meanings available on its own accord very early on.
Giora, however, argues that context would not penetrate lexical access.
Although it has a predictive role that may speed up derivation of ap-
propriate meaning, the context would not obstruct inappropriate, coded
meanings upon encounter with the lexical stimulus. So a novice learning
how to use computer software may activate the literal meaning of mouse
since to him/her that sense is more accessible than the appropriate one.
3.2. The sociolinguistic view
How does salience relate to the internal interpretation of context and the
cognitive theory of cultural meaning (Strauss–Quinn 1997; Gee 1999)?
According to the latter, words and pragmatic units can create their own
contexts because they represent cultural models, standard contexts that
have psychological reality for the socio-cultural group which considers
them as reflections of reality. This derives from the unique reciprocity
between language and reality. Language does two things simultaneously:
it reflects reality (the way things are), and constructs reality to be a
certain way. Gee (1999, 82) argued that reciprocity is a good term to
describe this property of language but reflexivity is a more commonly
used term because language and context are like two mirrors which face
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each other and “constantly and endlessly reflect their own images back
and forth between each other.”
The GSH gives psycholinguistic support to the sociolinguistic “move-
ment” that started with Gumperz (1982), who said that utterances some-
how carry with them their own context or project the context. Referring
to Gumperz’s work, Levinson (2003) argued that the message versus con-
text opposition is false because the message can carry with it or forecast
the context. Researchers, however, seem to hang on to the opposition
because they focus on the foreground or message content, and it is the
background that tends to project the context. Analyzing the relation-
ship of situation-bound utterances (cf. Fónagy 1982; Kiefer 1996; Kecs-
kés 2000) and context, Kecskés (2003; 2004) concluded that the actual
contextual meaning is the result of an interaction between the activated
world knowledge represented by the actual context and prior world ex-
perience (standard contexts) encoded in the pragmatic units the speak-
ers have chosen to use. This unique, two-way and dynamic relation of
present and past contexts makes discourse as vivid and expressive as it
is. It also confirms what Gumperz (1982; 1992) has claimed: Social sit-
uations partially determine the choice of code, and yet that code-choice
can partially determine situations.
Gumperz speaks about utterances, and the GSH focuses on lexical
units: words and expressions. This, however, does not change the fact
that there are no meanings that are context-free because each lexical item
or pragmatic unit is always implicitly indexed to a standard context of
reference. Lexical and pragmatic units code the history of their prior
contextual use. So it can be argued that there are two types of contexts:
one that is encapsulated in the lexical units as the result of prior and
partly or fully conventionalized use, and another that is actual context
and is activated in the process of verbal interaction (Kecskés 2003; 2004).
Salient meaning emerges as the most conventional, familiar, and frequent
out of this prior use. Actual context comes in as a regulator when there is
discrepancy between the coded standard context and the actual context.
In this regulatory process it is the actual context that has the final word.
3.3. Hierarchy of utterance interpretation
As a result of the latest psycholinguistic research, a view which consid-
ers utterance interpretation hierarchical has emerged. According to this,
utterance interpretation starts with the lexical meaning of the word or
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pragmatic unit. If it does not lead to the relevant interpretation, then the
immediate context comes into play. If this does not result in a pragmat-
ically appropriate interpretation either, the context should be extended
(cf. Giora 1997; Bierwisch 1997; Bibok–Németh T. 2001). The hierarchy
of interpretation looks like this:
(4) Lexical interpretation → Immediate context → Extended context
This approach is in accordance with the two-level semantic (lexical se-
mantics vs. conceptual semantics) theory (cf. Bierwisch 1997; Bibok 2000
and the relevance theory of Sperber–Wilson 1995).
Several researchers have come to support this hierarchy of utterance
interpretation although they took different paths. While Giora (1997;
2003) called this interpretation the “Graded Salience Hypothesis”, Bi-
bok and Németh T. (2001) took a different route via the principle of
relevance which states that “human cognition tends to be geared to the
maximization of relevance” (Sperber–Wilson 1995, 260). This means
that in communication we want to achieve more cognitive effects with
less processing effort (cf. Wray 2002). Consequently, processing should
start with the most obvious and/or most salient meaning of lexical units
making up the utterance. However, this meaning is either relevant to
the given context or not. So relevance and salience are not the same,
although sometimes what is salient is also relevant.
Supporters of the two-level semantic theory, relevance theory and
GSH approach all agree with the hierarchy of interpretation which ba-
sically supports a modular view. The difference is in their approach to
the question of what meaning(s) of a lexical unit is (are) activated in the
first phase of processing and what the role of context is in this phase:
Classic modular view: All meanings are activated and context selects
the right one at a post-access stage. Examining the contextual behavior
of ambiguous words, Gibbs (1996) came to the conclusion that people
momentarily activate all the meanings of an ambiguous word, with con-
text then working to clarify its meaning. Context becomes operative only
at a post-access stage, guiding the selection of the contextually relevant
meaning of the ambiguous word.
Modified modular view of two-level semanticists: According to the fol-
lowers of two-level semantic theory (cf. Bierwisch 1997; Bibok–Németh T.
2001) underspecified word meanings are activated in the first phase of in-
terpretation. This approach claims that lexical units get into the context
underspecified. It is argued that the specification of word meaning in
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context is achieved by conceptual shift. In other words, interpretations
mean mapping underspecified semantic meanings onto fully determined
conceptual meanings on the basis of our world knowledge.
The relevance theory approach: According to relevance theory, the
linguistically encoded meaning acts as no more than a starting point for
inferring the speaker’s meaning (Sperber–Wilson 1995). Linguistic de-
coding (bottom-up process) needs the selection of appropriate contextual
assumptions (top-down process) that assist the inferential process. Al-
though Sperber and Wilson (1995) do not say this directly, they also refer
to some kind of underspecified meaning in the first phase of comprehen-
sion because word meaning for them is only “a starting point” of the
inferential process and becomes specific only in context.
The GSH differs from each of these three approaches in that it main-
tains that the most salient meaning(s) is (are) activated in the first phase
of processing, and the activation process is graded with the most salient
meaning coming first. It is important to repeat here the most important
claim of the GSH: In the first phase of processing lexical and contextual
processing run parallel but do not interact, and context becomes deci-
sive only in the second phase of processing. Based on this claim it can
hardly be maintained that word meaning is underspecified in the first
phase of processing. Lexical meaning and contextual meaning are “equal
partners” from the starting point of the comprehension process. They
both represent world knowledge, but a different kind. Kecskés (2004)
argued that world knowledge is available to interlocutors in two forms:
encapsulated in lexical items based on prior encounters and experience
(occurrence in prior contexts), and in the actual linguistic and extralin-
guistic context framed by the given situation. Meaning is the result of
the interaction of the two sides of world knowledge. When language is
used we both create context and situations (make things meaningful in
certain ways and not others) and fit, adjust and adapt our language to
these ongoing contexts and situations (e.g., Gumperz 1982; Gee 1999).
3.4. Types of processing in the GSH and their pragmatic relevance
The GSH claims that different linguistic expressions (salient–less salient)
may tap different (direct/parallel/sequential) processes. Direct process-
ing applies when highly salient meanings are intended. When, for in-
stance, the most salient meaning is intended (e.g., the figurative mean-
ing of conventional idioms, or the special communicative function of
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situation-bound utterances), it is accessed directly, without having to
process the less salient (literal) meaning first (Gibbs 1980; Giora 1997).
We can take the figurative meaning of a conventional idiom as an example:
(5) Jim: “Joe, can you fix my car?”
Joe: “Piece of cake.”
If piece of cake is processed literally, it does not fit into the context.
However, we do not look at the context first, rather we opt for the more
accessible information. This situation also suggests that context affects
comprehension after highly salient information has been accessed. If it is
compatible with the context, no further effort is needed as the principle
of relevance requires and the GSH claims. If, however, there is no match,
the search for possible alternatives continues.
Parallel processing is induced when more than one meaning is salient.
Conventional metaphors whose metaphoric and literal meanings are equal-
ly salient are initially processed both literally and metaphorically (Blasko–
Connie 1993). According to the GSH, top-down contextual processes can
be predictive and affect the availability of meanings very early on. How-
ever, these guessing, inferential processes do not interact with lexical
processes but run parallel (Giora 2003, 22). Context plays a critical role
in the first phase of processing in cases when a lexical unit does not have
a dominant salient meaning so it may have more than one very frequent,
stereotypical, familiar, and equally conventionalized meaning as in the
following situations. The expression What’s wrong with you? has two
almost equally salient meanings:
(6) Sam: “Coming for a drink?”
Andy: “Sorry, I can’t. My doctor won’t let me.”
Sam: “What’s wrong with you?” (Maley 1980, 10)
In this situation the pragmatic unit What’s wrong with you? is an in-
quiry about the health condition of Andy. This sense is triggered by the
contextual cue my doctor which precedes the pragmatic unit. If, how-
ever, we change this contextual cue to my mother-in-law, the meaning of
What’s wrong with you? will change with it in the following way:
(7) Sam: “Coming for a drink?”
Andy: “Sorry, I can’t. My mother-in-law won’t let me.”
Sam: “What’s wrong with you?”
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Here, the pre-text activates the appropriate sense of What’s wrong with
you? As said above, prior context can affect the accessibility of the mean-
ing of a word or an expression. A prior occurrence of a word (mother-in-
law) which is semantically or pragmatically (as in the example) related
to a following word or expression (What’s wrong with you? ) may ease
the processing of that word or expression: the selection of the context-
appropriate sense out of the more than one possible salient senses. Con-
cretely, the word mother-in-law triggers the other salient meaning of the
expression which means something like ‘Are you insane?’
When a less rather than a more salient meaning is intended (e.g.,
the metaphorical meaning of novel metaphors, the literal meaning of con-
ventional idioms, a novel interpretation of a highly conventional literal
expression, or the literal meaning of a conventional situation-bound utter-
ance) comprehension seems to involve a sequential process, in which the
more salient meaning is processed initially, before the intended meaning
is derived (Blasko–Connine 1993; Gibbs 1996). This can be illustrated
with the following conversation:
(8) (John has fallen into a hole and talks to his friend:)
John: “Bob, get me out of this hole, will you? Give me a hand.”
Bob: “OK, I am calling the firemen.”
John: “Don’t. . . just give me your hand.”
The expression Give me a hand has its figurative meaning ‘help’ as the
most salient. At the same time it can be used in its literal sense as well.
The conversation shows that the misunderstanding happened because
Bob processed the figurative rather than the literal meaning first. This
can be explained by the fact that in the given situation both interpreta-
tions appeared to be relevant.
4. Conclusion
No matter from what perspective we are looking at language processing,
the unique interplay of prior and actual knowledge reflected in the lexical
units and context needs to get special attention. The GSH helps us
reveal the mechanisms responsible for this interaction. The main claim
of the hypothesis is that salient meanings are processed automatically
(though not necessarily solely), irrespective of contextual information
and strength of bias in the first phase of comprehension when lexical
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processing and contextual processing run parallel (Giora 2003, 24). This
assumes that while context can be predictive of certain meanings, it is
deemed ineffective in obstructing initial access of salient information.
It was demonstrated that the GSH can contribute significantly to our
understanding of pragmatic processing. In this study priority was given
to issues concerning the interpretation of the role of lexical meaning and
context in the process of comprehension. The GSH calls our attention to
three important facts about context:
It is reasonable to talk about two types of context: prior convention-
alized context encoded in the lexical units and actual situational context
with its linguistic and extralinguistic elements. It was argued that the
particular power of salience derives from the process of interaction be-
tween prior contexts (represented in lexical units) and actual contexts
that result in what we call “what is communicated”.
Context is a regulator rather than a selector. Since not all possi-
ble meanings of a lexical unit are activated during language processing,
there is nothing for context to select. However, when the most probable
meaning is activated, context needs to rule whether that is the relevant
meaning or not.
Although salience goes together with a certain kind of rigidity, it is
not negative at all. Rigidity and search for novelty are equally present on
our mind. Erman and Warren (2001) argued that about half of our writ-
ten (52.3%) and spoken (58.6%) language consists of routines—prefabri-
cated expressions whose meanings and forms have been conventionalized
and lexicalized. These formulaic units usually have a salient meaning
which creates the same or similar context for most speakers of that lan-
guage community. However, salience and novelty are not enemies, in fact
they are intertwined and feed on each other. Novelty often means change
in salience rather than invention of something entirely new. On the one
hand language relies on bleaching, on the other it looks for protection
against it. The constant pursuit of novel experiences can be considered
a reaction against the process of bleaching, of becoming salient, which is
the result of repetitive exposure. Giora (2003, 35) says that how salience
shifts is still a mystery. Not really. We at least know where to seek an
explanation.
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